Thursday, February 10, 2011

What Economics Doesn't Have to do with Libertarianism

Do economists really believe that they have anything to learn or say about philosophical libertarianism? I mean, free markets make sense, but "taxation as theft" type talk?

By "philosophical libertarianism," I refer to the deontological belief in the value of liberty and property--that violating liberty and property is wrong in and of itself. Major thinkers along those lines include Locke, Nozick (circa the mid-70s), and Rothbard. I recall Mankiw discussing Nozick as the counterpoint to Rawls in his intro textbook chapter on redistribution, as if Nozick presents a point in Anarchy, State, and Utopia that should inform economic discussions. And Bryan Caplan likes to remind us occasionally that reasonable people sometimes think that taxation is theft.

Economics as a discipline, though, is explicitly focused on economic outcomes. Economic theory is entirely, exclusively about the consequences of economic interaction for the agents involved.  Normative economics, then, can only be carried out under the umbrella of consequentialist ethics/political philosophy. That is, economics can only guide us to "better outcomes" if we are judging on the basis of outcomes. So the economist might choose an ethical framework, be it classical utilitarian, or Rawlsian, or egoistic, but it never be the type that Nozick or Rothbard have supported. Why? Because once you become concerned with "procedural fairness" and Kantian categoricals, then outcomes don't matter, and economics is therefore entirely irrelevant.

Now, if you are a textbook authors and have latent libertarian sympathies, maybe its worth warning incoming freshmen that Nozick might be right, and it might therefore be worth jumping ship before committing too much time to irrelevant study. But beyond that, I can't imagine why so many economists like to talk about those guys. At least any more than they like to talk about Islamic conceptions of sin and duty or Hellenistic stoicism.

Armchair Follies

The Economist's Democracy in America blog posted recently posted a response to Stephen Landsburg's (author of the Armchair Economist) outrage that an opponent to a constitutional ban on gay marriage made a rhetorical appeal instead of offering statistically significant results. Landsburg had said:



In a video that’s begun to go viral, University of Iowa engineering student Zach Wahls attempts to refute this notion [that gay people, on average, are less successful as parents] without offering a shred of evidence beyond a single cherry-picked case (his own) to prove that children of gay parents sometimes turn out just fine (except, perhaps, for their ability to reason)...
What’s particularly disturbing to me is all the chatter about how eloquent this kid is, as if eloquence in the service of intellectual misdirection were somehow something to be admired.

 The Economist blogger nails the response:

He's got no problem with gay marriage, as far as I know. And he certainly doesn't think people should undermine their honourable aims by behaving irrationally. So what gives? My guess is that, like a number of right-leaning economists, Mr Landsburg has a regrettable tendency toward tone-deaf, context-dropping, contrarian provocation based on an unexamined assumption that this is what it means to be bravely rational. It is not.

 That same thought kept popping into my head while reading The Armchair Economist. Landsburg and his intellectual brethren frequently make interesting analytical observations, however, the lessons and judgments that they seem to think follow are, well, tone deaf. His stubborn resistance to leaving his armchair allows him to construe the problems he wants to solve in a way that simply doesn't recognizably reflect the real world. Moreover, it allows him to act like everyone else is less rational (stupider, really) than him, because he never really stops to think about what everyone else involved might be thinking or what is really motivating their positions. But it's hard to take someone like that too seriously.

I'd also note that one of the major features that distinguishes right-wing from left-wing types is one's willingness to give other parties the benefit of the doubt--and it's probably a more important determinant than belief in "individual responsibility."